METAPHYSICS – AN OVERVIEW :

Some Important Issues:  (1) What account is to be given of the very concept of a mind?  (2) What type of analysis is to be given of statements about different types of mental states?  (3) Are there any significant divisions between types of mental states, in the sense that a very different type of account might have to be given for some types of mental states than others?  (4) What is the "mark" of the mental?  That is to say, what is it that distinguishes states of affairs that are mental states from those that are not?  (Consciousness and intentionality as two important answers.)

Four Different Accounts of the Analysis of Mental Concepts:  (1) One anti-reductionist approach:  a "raw feel", or "qualia", or phenomenalistic account;
(2) A second anti-reductionist approach:  intentionality as a defining property of mental states;  (3) Analytical, or logical, behaviorism;  (4) Functionalism, and the identification of mental states (primarily) on the basis of their causal roles, rather than on the basis of their intrinsic natures.  The computer program analogy.

Three Main Families of Views Concerning the Nature of the Mind:
(1) Physicalistic views of a reductionist sort;  (2) Non-physicalistic views;
(3) Emergent physicalism.

Physicalistic Views of a Reductionist Sort:  (1) Analytical behaviorism: concepts of mental states are to be analyzed in terms of behavior – both actual behavior and behavioral dispositions;  (2) Mind-brain identity theory:  This involves (a) a functionalist account of the mind, and of mental states; (b) an identification of those functional states with the physical states that realize them;  (3) Mental states are functional states, physically realized.  This involves (a) a functionalist account of the mind, and of mental states; (b) an identification of mental states with, so to speak, the program that the brain is running, rather than with the specific physical processes that are involved in the running of the program;  (4) Eliminativism:  this is the view that no minds, and no mental states, exist.

Non-Physicalistic Views:  (1) Property dualism:  there are non-physical properties, in the form of emergent qualia;  (2) Intentional state dualism – according to which intentionality is the mark of the mental;  (3) Substance dualism: the mind is an immaterial entity;  (4) Idealism - the view that there is no mind-independent physical world.

Emergent Physicalism:  There are emergent, sensuous properties - qualia - but they are physical properties, and everything that exists is purely physical.

Property Dualism versus Emergent Physicalism:  Does one have logically privileged access to qualia, or are they in principle publicly observable?

Arguments for Substance Dualism: (1) The argument from personal identity, advanced by Richard Swinburne; (2) The argument from human freedom and responsibility; (3) The knowledge argument, advanced by J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae; (4) The argument from intentionality; (5) The argument from the existence of paranormal powers, such as telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis; (6) The argument from out-of-body experiences, and near-death experiences.

Arguments against Substance Dualism:  (1) General arguments for materialism;  (2) The crucial argument: the appeal to specific facts about humans, including (a) the results of blows to the head, (b) the effects of damage to different parts of the brain, (c) diseases that affect mental functioning, including Alzheimer’s, (d) aging and the mind, (e) the gradual development of psychological capacities as humans mature, (f) the inheritance of intellectual abilities and psychological traits, (g) the great psychological similarity between identical twins than between fraternal twins, (h) the existence of psychotropic drugs, which can affect one’s mental state and functioning; and (i) the correlations between differences in psychological capacities across species with differences in the neural structures found in their brains.  

Analytical Behaviorism:  (1) Actual behavior versus behavioral dispositions;  (2) The irrelevance of the nature of the causal connections between stimulus and response.

A Functionalist Analysis of Mental Concepts:  (1) Mental states are individuated into different types on the basis of relations to (a) stimulation of the organism, (b) behavioral response, and (c) other mental states;  (2) On most functionalist accounts, the relations in question are causal relations.  So a mental state is the type of mental state it in virtue of its causal role.  (David Armstrong also allows the relation of resemblance.)  (3) The intrinsic nature of a state is irrelevant to the question of whether it is a mental state, and, if so, what type of mental state it is.

Objections to Analytical Behaviorism:   (l) The inverted spectrum argument;
(2) The unconsciousness, or absent qualia, argument;  (3) The understanding sensation terms argument.  (Compare Thomas Nagel's "What it's like to be a bat" argument, or Frank Jackson's case of Mary.)

A Crucial Question: Do the preceding objections to analytical behaviorism also tell against a functionalist account of metal concepts?